Tuesday, January 11, 2022

The Burden Of Proof

To the extent that our critic friends attempt to disprove something, the burden of proof is on them. Likewise, to the extent a believer attempts to prove something, the burden of proof is on the believer. And so forth.

For instance, if the believer asserts that details in the text of the Book of Abraham correlate with details in other ancient stories about Abraham, and cites this as evidence that the Book of Abraham is authentic, the critic can counter this if they can show that contemporary sources of that information were likely available to Joseph Smith. The critic does not need to prove that Joseph used those contemporary sources, only that it is plausible that Joseph used them, in order to show that the believer's deductive argument is not sound (of course, if enough examples pile up, and if the only plausible sources are obscure, the critic may need to account for how Joseph could have acquired the sources and had time to study them, etc., and that could potentially affect the plausibility which the critic needs to show). 

However, this goes both ways.

For instance, if the critic asserts that believers can never theorize a "loose" translation of the Book of Mormon, because David Whitmer described the process by saying Joseph would see English words appear and then read them out loud, believers can counter this by pointing out that the burden is on the critic to demonstrate that Whitmer's understanding is not only reliable but is incompatible with a loose translation.

When either believer or critic is cornered like this, they may find it tempting to simply say that their conclusion is clearly the only logical one. Ironically, when they say something like this, they are actually appealing to intuition rather than to logic. I think this is the point where constructive communication often breaks down.

In the loose translation case, the critic could demonstrate reliability by pointing out that Martin Harris, apparently independently, provided a somewhat similar, though not identical, description of the translation process. However, neither man claimed to know why each specific set of words would appear, rather than different sets of words. We can't assume they had a complete understanding. Even Oliver did not understand. In D&C 9, the process seems to involve studying it out in his mind and then finding out if the wording he has come up with is acceptable to God.

We don't know what Joseph experienced during the translation process. We don't know if he even remembered all of it, or if it was like a dream he only recalled faint bits and pieces of. And, importantly, we don't know what criteria God used for approving Joseph's translation. Given that human language is inherently flawed, God may have approved Joseph's word choices based on how well they reflected Joseph's best efforts, rather than how close to "perfection" they came (see Ether 12:25-26). So, Joseph could have plausibly chosen the wording and then, if God approved, the wording would appear for him to read.

Some critics might say there wasn't enough time for Joseph to choose words. But, again, it is their burden to demonstrate this. Neither Harris nor Whitmer specified, and although we could get into calculations of how many pages were translated in certain amounts of time, and how long it might take a scribe to write each sentence, and so forth, ultimately it is not the believer's burden. Still, this may be a good opportunity to illustrate how intuition can be flawed. Since Joseph performed his translation through the gift and power of God, time is somewhat moot. An Interpreter article by Roger Nicholson reports this insight from Matthew B. Brown: “Joseph Smith reportedly said in 1826, while under examination in a court of law, that when he first obtained his personal Seer stone he placed it in his hat, and discovered that time, place, and distance were annihilated; that all intervening obstacles were removed, and that he possessed one of the attributes of Deity, an All-Seeing Eye." Brown goes on to note that Brigham Young confirmed this view: "When Joseph had a revelation he had, as it were, the eyes of the Lord. He saw as the Lord sees.”

At this point, a critic might characterize a believer's reliance on "loose translation" as an argument from absence unless the believer can prove it. But, again, context does matter here. If a believer is responding to a critic's attempt to disprove, then the believer is free to stipulate something like loose translation, given that it is at least plausible, because the burden of proof is on the critic. However, if a believer makes an argument trying to prove something about the Church, but the argument is only sound if loose translation is true, then no matter how valid the argument is, it will only hold weight against the critic to the extent the believer is able to provide evidence that a loose translation model is viable.

To illustrate this, imagine you own a bank, and you only share the vault combination with the manager. One day, a large sum of money is missing from the vault. Would it be logical to accuse the manager of either stealing it or sharing the combination with someone else? Seemingly so. But what if someone claims that the Great Pumpkin could have stolen it without unlocking the vault? Doesn't matter, right? Because, even though it is being offered in defense, the Great Pumpkin explanation has not been shown to be plausible. However, what if someone points out that there's a huge hole in the wall of the vault, cut from the outside? Would your deductive case against the manager still hold up unless the manager is able to actually prove that the burglar came in through the hole? Or, would the mere existence of the hole blow a hole in the deductive argument against the manager? The manager would not need to show that the burglar actually came in through the hole. 

Now, as an aside, what's the difference between believing in God and the Great Pumpkin? Well, where does one's knowledge of God come from, and where does one's knowledge of the Great Pumpkin come from? The difference is revelation.

In all the world, only the God of Abraham has left not just written stories or myths but documents that actually detail His ongoing interactions with man, recorded by the very societies of people (a "chosen people") who experienced the events, like a journal, as these events unfolded over hundreds and thousands of years. This same God promises to speak directly to us individually, and millions of people bear record that He has done so. Believing because of revelation is not blind faith. I saw an article saying “blind faith in religion” destroys critical thinking. I think these people may be confusing their personal intuition with objective logic. Can they calculate the probability of a personal God existing? I don’t think so. With science mostly now believing in a multi-verse, where infinite things are possible, including things which defy our laws of physics, and with infinite unknowns and inherent limits on man’s ability to comprehend, there’s no way to objectively calculate the probability of a personal God existing. What we can deduce however is that if a personal God exists, that being is choosing to not reveal Himself to us in a scientific, objective fashion. That does not mean He is not revealing Himself, however. Why would anyone think such a being would be incapable of revealing Himself to individuals, making Himself known on His terms? The default position is not “no God.” The default position should simply be, “we humans ought to be humble about how little we know - we can’t even comprehend what space, time, energy, matter or consciousness are - we can only observe aspects of how they interact. The fact that intelligence exists is inductive evidence that more intelligence can exist. The fact that matter, time, energy, consciousness, etc. exist is inductive evidence that other forms of these things can exist other than the forms we have been exposed to in our limited ability to observe reality.”